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BROKAW v. BLACK-FOXE MILITARY INSTITUTE
[L.A. No. 21508.

In Bank.

[37 C.2d

May 25, 1951.]

ROBER 'I' BROKAW, a Minor, etc., et al., Respondents, v.
BLACK-FOXE MILITARY INSTITUTE et al., Defendants; HOLLYWOOD COMMERCIAL BUILDINGS,
INCORPORATED (a Corporation), Appellant.
~

[1] Schools-Liability-Injuries to Pupils-Evidence.-A finding
that an automobile driver was acting as a school's agent and
within his authority when his student passenger was injured
en route to the driver's home is sustained by evidence that
the driver, a part-time employee of the school who often took
students on scheduled out?ngs, on learning the student had not
gone with the others on one of these outings, secured permission of the officer in charge before proceeding to take the
student to the driver's home and then to the destination of
the outing.
[2] Agency-Questions of Fact.-Existence of agency is generally
a question of fact to be determined on consideration of all the
evidence rather than on any specific testimony as to the fact
of agency, and a finding of agency will not be disturbed
merely because evidence justifies an inference to the contrary.
[3] Automobiles-Evidence-Negligence of Operator.-An automobile driver's negligence in failing to keep a proper lookout
or in following a vehicle too closely, and its causal connection
with a passenger's injury, may properly be inferred from evidence that he was talking to passengers when a truck several
car lengths ahead stopped and that he ran into the truck
because he was traveling too fast to stop.
[4a, 4b] Trial-V.erdict-Two Defendants-Verdict Silent as to
One.-A verdict against one of two defendants but silent as
to the other is not a verdict in favor of such other unless
instructions show a contrary meaning, but is merely a failure
to find on all the issues.
[5] Master and Servant-Liability to Third Persons-Verdict.In an action against several defendants, including a master
and servant, failure to return a verdict as to the servant while
rendering one against the master does not exonerate the
servant so as to relieve the master of liability based on
respondeat sttperior, but is merely an incomplete verdict.
[2] See 1 Cal.Jur. 696, 865; 2 Am.Jur. 359.
[ 4] See 24 Cal.Jur. 880; 53 Am.Jur. 719.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Schools, § 74; [2] Agency, §§ 231,
235(4); [3] Automobiles,§ 215; [4] Trial, § 221; [5] Master and
Servant, § 217; [6] Appeal and Error, § 1166, 1185; [7] Schools,
§ 75; [8] Trial,§ 225.
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[6] Appeal-Presumptions-Instructions and Verdict.-An appellate court will presume that instructions and forms of verdict
given to the jury, but not in the record were proper, and that
under the issues a proper verdict was returned, notwithstanding it is silent as to one of several defendants.
[7a, 7b] Schools-Liability-Injuries to Pupils-Verdict.-Where
a student through his mother as guardian b'rough'.:. an action
against his school and its employee for injuries sustained by
him, while a passenger, through the alleged negligent operation
of an automobile by such employee in the course of his
employment, and the student and his mother in her individual
capacity brought another action against the school only for
injuries sustained through its negligence in permitting the
student to leave the school grounds, a verdict for both the
student and his mother against the school only will be sustained as based· on the negligence of the employee in the
operation of the automobile imputed to the school under the
doctrine of respondeat superior, notwithstanding the verdict
is silent as to the employee, especially where propriety of the
verdict was affirmed on motion for a new trial, and where, the
instructions and forms of verdict being absent from the record
and the mother having sought medical expenses in both actions,
it may reasonably be concluded that the jury failed to distinguish between her positions in the two actions.
[8] Trial-Verdict-Objections-Waiver.-In the absence of an
objection as to the form of a verdict, its failure to segregate
the amount awarded a mother, as guardian, for her son's
medical expenses from that awarded him for injuries is
waived.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Thomas J. Cunningham, Judge. Affirmed.
Actions for damages for personal injuries. Judgment for
plaintiffs against one defendant, affirmed.
Tripp & Callaway mid Hulen C. Callaway for Appellant.
Robert J. Sullivan and Lewis L. Clarke, Jr., for Respondents.
CARTER, J.-Defendant Hollywood Commercial Buildings, Incorporated, doing business as Black-Foxe Military Institute (hereinafter termed the school), appeals from a judgment on a jury verdict assessing damages against it for personal injuries suffered by a student of the school.
The injuries arose out of a collision which occurred off the
school grounds between an automobile driven by one Elvin
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Martin, in which the student was riding, and a truck. Two
related but separate actions were filed and were consolidated
for trial. The first action, brought by the student, Robert
Brokaw, a minor, through his guardian ad litem, was based
on a charge of negligent driving, and named as defendants,
the driver of the truck, the driver of the automobile, the owner
of the automobile, and (on a master-servant theory) the school.
In the second action, the student (by his guardian ad litem)
and his mother sued the school on the theory of negligence
in allowing the student to leave the school premises, or negligent failure to supervise. A motion for nonsuit was granted
in favor of the truck driver, without objection by plaintiffs.
The jury made a special finding that Martin, the driver of
the automobile in which the student was riding, was acting
as agent of the school and in the course and scope of his authority at the time of the accident. A consolidated (single)
verdict for $10,000 against the school was rendered in favor
of the student and his mother. No verdict was rendered either
for or against Martin. As ground for reversal the school
(hereinafter sometimes termed defendant) urges that the evidence wholly fails to support a finding that any negligence
chargeable to it contributed proximately to the student's injuries. It urges that it was not negligent in permitting Robert to leave the school grounds with Martin, and that if it
was, such negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident. That contention need not be discussed as we believe
the judgment may be supported on the theory that Robert
was injured as the result of Martin's negligence in the operation of the car and that he was acting within the scope of his
employment by the school at the time of the accident. In that
connection it is asserted that Martin was not negligent and
he was not the agent of the school.
It was an established practice of the school to conduct
organized outings on Saturdays for the boys, which they were
free to attend or not, as they wished. The boys did not pay a
special transportation charge for the school's station wagons
ordinarily used on the outings, but did have to pay for any
amusements or refreshments from their own spending money.
Martin was a young college student just under 21 years of age
who worked part time at the school; one of his duties was to
take the students on certain of the Saturday outings. He also
acted as teacher and counselor, and as dormitory and athletic
supervisor. .On the Saturday of the accident he had been
off duty, but shortly before noon had come to the school in
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an automobile owned by his father to pick up some belongings.
On that day Robert and certain other boys had not gone on
the school's regular organized outing to Long Beach because
they lacked spending money. When Martin learned of this
he offered to lend them spending money, take them to his
mother's home in Whittier for lunch, and then take them to
Long Beach to join the other boys. They went with Martin
to the officer in charge, who was the only person authorized
under the school rules to permit them to leave the school
grounds, and secured permission to go with Martin by the
specified route. The boys did not pay Martin for their transportation and did not discuss the matter. En route to Whittier in the automobile owned by Martin's father the collision
took place.
[1] Turning to the school's contention that the evidence
does not support the jury finding· that Martin was the school's
agent at the time of the collision, it appears that Lt. Redmond
was in charge at the school when the request was made of him
by Martin and the boys that the boys be permitted to go with
Martin to his home and then to the place of the regular Saturday outing. Redmond testified that he was the officer in
charge on that day; that a young student like Robert is not
allowed to leave the grounds unless he is ''in the charge of a
responsible person"; as to what transpired when the arrangement was made with Martin he said: ''I know Mr. Martin
said something about it to me and mentioned he was going
to his mother's at Whittier and have lunch, and was from there
going to Long Beach and would have the children back that
evening. I am not too positive, but I am quite sure that
I did request him to be back by 8 :00 o'clock or before because
they were leaving in the morning. I felt a day's outing was
sufficient without staying out too late." He knew Martin
as a colleague at the school. There had been a regular scheduled trip for the boys that day for an ''outing.'' Although
Martin did not take the boys on the instant Saturday outing,
it was one of his duties on every other Saturday. The foregoing is sufficient from which the jury could have inferred
that Martin was the agent of the school in taking the boys
on that occasion. True, it was not a regular scheduled outing, but it was in lieu thereof. When Redmond permitted
Martin to take the boys it may be inferred, he being an
instructor at the school, that he was authorized as such employee to do so. The school refers to testimony that the trip
had no connection with the school activities (probably the

278

BROKAW v. BLACK-FOXE MILITARY INSTITUTE

[37 C.2d

conclusion of the witnesses) ; that he received no pay for it;
that he was not on duty at the time; that he was on a trip of
his own; that he was driving his own car, and the like. That
creates nothing more than a conflict in the evidence. [2] While
it may be that an inference might flow therefrom that Martin
was acting merely as a matter of accommodation, that does
not require a reversal, as the existence of agency is generally
a question of fact, and ''whether he was such agent was an
issue sharply contested at the trial, and was to be determined
by the court upon a consideration of the entire evidence respecting the course pursued by him during the negotiations,
rather than upon any specific testimony by him or by the
defendant as to the fact of agency; and the inference which
the trial court might reasonably make from such evidence is
entitled to the same consideration as its finding of a fact upon
contradictory evidence." (Willey v. Clements, 146 Cal. 91
96 [79 P. 850] .) (See, also, Ferroni v. Pacific Finance Corp.,
21 Cal.2d 773 [135 P.2d 569]; 1 Cal.Jur., 696-7, 865.) Hathaway v. Siskiyou etc. School Dist., 66 Cal.App.2d 103 [151
P.2d 861], cited by the school is clearly distinguishable. There
the issue was whether a school pupil was the agent of the
school, when by permission of the school principal, she was
absent from school to advertise a nonschool carnival. Here
Martin was an employee of the school and it was in general
line of duty to take boys on outings and he was authorized
to take them on the fateful trip.
[3] There is substantial evidence of Martin's negligence
in driving the car, and that such negligence was a proximate
cause of the accident. Cruz A. Uribe was driving a truck
upgrade east on Fourth Street, in Los Angeles, at 20 miles
per hour. The engine was missing and he pulled next to the
curb in the extreme right lane and drove half the length of
his truck off of Fourth Street through an opening in the curb
and stopped. Martin was also driving east on Fourth Street
in the same traffic lane to the rear of the truck. According to
Martin, he was travelling 25 to 30 miles per hour, and the
truck was going slower and stopped when Martin's car was
several car lengths behind it. Martin's car ran into the truck.
He admitted that he was going too fast to stop. While he was
approaching the truck he was explaining and pointing out
to the boys a bridge which was there being constructed and
telling them to look at it. There is evidence that Martin's car
did nQt slow down prior to the impact. The jury could have
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concluded that Martin was not keeping a proper lookout
ahead or was travelling too closely behind the truck.
[4a] It is claimed that the jury exonerated Martin, and
therefore, the verdict against the school cannot stand, as its
liability must rest upon the doctrine of respondeat superior.
(See Bradley v. Rosenthal, 154 Cal. 420 [97 P. 875, 129 Am.St.
Rep. 171]; Pimple v. Southern Pac. Co., 38 Cal.App. 727
[177 P. 871].) It does not appear, however, that there was a
verdict for Martin. The jury's verdict was for Robert and
his mother and against the school. That is tantamount to no
verdict with respect to Martin. [5] It may occur, as it did
here, that in an action against several defendants, including
a master and his servant, the jury may return a verdict
against the master and remain silent as to the servant. In
such a case the failure to :find as to the servant is not an exoneration of him, thus relieving the master of liability where the
cause of action is based upon the doctrine of respondeat superior. It is merely an incomplete verdict in that it fails to
dispose of the liability of all of the parties defendant. [4b] In
this connection, it is said in Irelan-Yuba etc. Min. Co. v.
Pacific G. &; E., 18 Cal.2d 557, 570 [116 P.2d 611]: "It is
well settled that a verdict against one of two defendants but
which is silent as to the other defendant is not a verdict in
favor of the latter but is merely a failure on the part of the
jury to :find upon all of the issues.'' That has been held to
be the rule in many cases. (Fennessey v. Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co., 10 Cal.2d 538 [76 P.2d 104] ; Benson v. Southern Pac. Co.,
177 Cal. 777 [171 P. 948]; Rankin v. Central Pacific R. R. Co.,
73 Cal. 93 [15 P. 57]; Benjamin v. Stewart, 61 Cal. 605; Lloyd
v. Boulevard Express, 79 Cal.App. 406 [249 P. 837]; Keller
v. Smith, 130 Cal.App. 128 [19 P.2d 541] ; Broome v. Kern
Valley Packing Co., 6 Cal.App.2d 256 [44 P.2d 430).)
It is suggested, however, that the above rule is subject
to the quali:fications that the verdict must be construed with
reference to the pleadings, evidence and instructions to the
jury, and that as the :first action, based on the theory of
respondeat superior and the negligence of Martin, the servant,
had only Robert as the plaintiff, and the second, based on
the theory of negligence in supervision, had as plaintiffs both
Robert and his mother, the jury, in :finding for both the
student and his mother, must have based its verdict on the
latter theory. The rule is, however, that the silence as to one
defendant stands as no verdict as to him unless the instructions to the jury show a contrary meaning. It has been held
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that the pleadings and evidence must also be examined. (See
Fennessey v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., supra; Irelan-Yuba etc.
Min. Co. v.Pacific G. & E., supra.) [6] But here the instructions and forms of verdict given to the jury are not in the record. We must presume, therefore, that they were proper, and
under the issues so presented, a proper verdict was returned
(Snodgrass v. Hand, 220 Cal. 446 [31 P.2d 198].) [7a] It
must be observed in this connection, and also in connection
with the form of verdict in favor of Robert and his mother,
that in the first action, the one based on respondeat superior
and the negligence of Martin, while the mother was not named
formally as a party, she appeared formally therein as the
guardian ad litem of Robert, and she alleged therein, that as
such guardian, she incurred hospital and medical expenses,
and in the prayer, such expenses are claimed. The same was
done in the second action, based on lack of supervision by
the school, except she appears formally as plaintiff. In either
case, she, for herself, was not entitled to recover any more than
those expenses. The only reasonable conclusion is, therefore,
that the jury, in returning a verdict in favor of both her and
her son, included her merely because of such medical expenses.
We cannot presume error in the verdict by speculating
that both were included in the verdict because both were
formally named in the second action and that it was predicated
upon the theory of that action. We cannot suppose that the
jury indulged in any such finespun legal theories or even
knew that the mother was a formal party in one action and
not the other. On the contrary, not having the instructions or forms of verdict before us, we must assume that she
was treated by them as a plaintiff in both actions, and that the
jury was told that she was entitled to hospital expenses incurred on behalf of Robert, if Martin was negligent in driving the car, and that such a verdict was proper. [8] Insofar as the verdict might be questioned for failing to segregate
the amount awarded to the mother for medical expenses from
that awarded to Robert for personal injuries, it does not appear that any objection was made to the form of verdict; it
was, therefore, waived. (Brown v. Regan, 10 Cal.2d 519 [75
P.2d 1063].)
[7b] Moreover, throughout the trial the mother was treated
as a plaintiff without regard to which action was involved.
The actions were tried as one action. Defendants' counsel
in his motion for a nonsuit referred to the two actions as one
in which two causes of action were stated, one on each theory
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-respondeat superior and negligence in supervision. Certainly that is tantamount to treating the mother as a plaintiff
under both theories or actions. Furthermore, a motion
for a new trial was made on the same ground (impropriety
of the verdict) and was denied. The trial court's conclusion,
knowing the jury instructions and the trial proceedings, must
be given great weight. (See Snodgrass v. Hand, 220 Cal. 446
[31 P.2d 198].)
The judgment is affirmed.
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
SCHAUER, J.-I dissent. It appears to me that on the
record in this case the verdict cannot be sustained upon any
theory of liability, and that the judgment should be reversed.
As related in the opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Carter,
two actions were :filed. In the :first action (No. 528375) the
student as the sole party plaintiff sued the school and Martin
(the driver of the automobile in which the student was riding
when injured). In the second action (No. 540614) the student and his mother, as parties plaintiff, sued the school only
(on the theory of negligence or breach of contract in letting
the student leave the school premises). The jury returned
a verdict in favor of the student and his mother against the
school only. This verdict :fits precisely the pleadings of the
second action; as to the parties plaintiff and as to the party
defendant in that action it resolves all the issues. It does
not fit and does not appear to be responsive to the pleadings,
parties or issues of the :first action. It seems to me that the
only reasonable conclusion is that the verdict is based solely
on the theory of the second action (No. 540614).
I think that on close analysis even the argument in Justice
Carter's opinion tends to support the above stated view rather
than the conclusion reached by him. He says (after mentioning the cases holding that the pleadings and evidence must
be examined, as well as the instructions to the jury, in determining the significance of a verdict as to one defendant and
its silence as to another) : ''But here the instructions and
forms of verdict given to the jury are not in the record. We
must presume, therefore, that they were proper, and under
the issues so presented, a proper verdict was returned. (Snodgrass v. Hand, 220 Cal. 446 [31 P.2d 198] .) " Applying that
quoted principle to the case here we should presume that
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"under the issues so presented, a proper verdict was returned.'' The verdict which the jury returned is legally
''proper'' in respect to the parties and the issues of the second
action; it is in favor of the two plaintiffs named in that action
and against the sole defendant. It is my firm conviction that
the evidence (which it would serve no useful purpose to elaborate here) is not sufficient to support a verdict in that action;
it wholly fails to establish the breach of any duty owed by
defendants.
Moreover, the superior court clerk's file in these cases has
been forwarded to this court. Further supporting the view
I have just expressed is the fact that the following instruction was given :
''If you find from the evidence that all of the defendants
in this action were guilty of negligence which proximately
cause the injuries received by the plaintiff Robert Brokaw
then your verdict must be for the plaintiffs against all of said
defendants.''
If we are to presume that the jury followed the instruction
-and we certainly have no right to presume otherwise-it
seems to me that we must conclude that the jury did not find
Martin guilty of negligence and could not have found BlackFoxe guilty of negligence on the theory of respondeat superior because of any act or omission of Martin's.
Even if this court could assume that by consolidating the
actions for trial it was intended to so amend the pleadings
as to include the mother as a party plaintiff in the first action
(No. 528375), and that the failure to find against Martin has
no significance, the most that can be said in favor of plaintiffsrespondents is that it is impossible to tell, then, upon which
theory the verdict is based; and since the evidence is insufficient to support a verdict based upon the theory advanced in
the second action (No. 540614), the judgment cannot be sustained. I would therefore reverse it.

